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Abstract: Many philosophers of action conceive intentions functionally, as executive states: intentions 
are mental states that represent an action and tend to cause this action. In the philosophical tradition 
another function of intentions, which may be called "volitive", played a much more prominent role: 
intentions are mental states that represent what kind of actions we want and prefer to be realized and 
thus synthesize in a possibly rational way our motivational, desiderative and perhaps affective as well 
as cognitive attitudes towards this action. In the paper it is argued that intentions must fulfil both 
functions. Then a concept of ‘intention’ is developed that integrates both functions. 
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1. Two Functions of Intentions 
Michael Bratman's book "Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason" [Bratman 1987] 
made popular, among others, a certain functional view of intentions. According to this 
view, intentions are executive states, i.e. they are mental states that represent an 
action, tend to cause the represented action as well as guide and sustain its execution.1 
Many philosophers since then have accepted this thesis [Adams 1994; 2007; Adams 
& Mele 1989; McCann 1998; Mele 1992, 72; 130; 136; 144; and at present probably 
it represents the most broadly accepted view in philosophy of action about the nature 
of intentions.  
 The present (at the beginning of the third millennium) popularity of this theory 
constitutes a rather radical and important change in philosophy of action because in 
the philosophical tradition another function of intentions played a much more 
prominent role. This function may be called the "volitive" function. That intentions 
have a volitive function here shall mean: intentions are mental states that represent 
what kind of actions we want and prefer to be realized and thus express and 
                                                 
1
  Bratman was not the first who held this functional view. Already in 1984 Myles Brand introduced a 
definition of 'intention', according to which intentions are those states that proximally cause an 
action [Brand 1984, 174]. Adams [1986] defended the functional view as well. However, the 
functional idea is still much older. Locke e.g. took volitions, i.e. intentions in the traditional 
terminology, to be exertions of the capacity of our soul to initiate, continue as well as to stop 
movements of our body by thoughts, which command the execution of these movements [Locke 
<1689> 2004, II,xxi,5]. 
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synthesize our motivational, desiderative and perhaps affective as well as cognitive 
attitudes towards this action and its alternatives; and this synthesis is or could be 
brought about at least in part by deliberation.2 To be sure, philosophers mostly did not 
use the word "intention", in the tradition they often spoke of "volitions" or "acts of 
will". Practical philosophers were particularly interested in this volitive function 
because they took it to be the result of our practical deliberation, which they studied 
with the hope to improve it and make it rational and thus making the resulting action 
rational as well. 
 The basic claim of this paper is the Two-Function Thesis: Full-fledged or real 
(implementation 3) intentions have to fulfil both functions, the volitive and the 
executive function. In the remaining part of this paper this thesis will be defended and 
elaborated. 
2. Why Full-fledged Intentions Must Fulfil Both, the Volitive 
and the Executive Function 
The volitive and the executive function of intention do not exclude each other; i.e. one 
and the same mental state can fulfil them both. This holds because they are defined 
functionally, and the two functions do not exclude each other. But why full-fledged or 
real intentions must have both functions – as my basic thesis says? The reason for this 
lies in the very nature of actions. The particular significance and importance of 
actions consists in the fact that, by acting, the psychic kernel of persons with its 
preferences and beliefs has the power to control – directly and, via predicted longer 
causal chains, also indirectly – (some parts of) the external and eventually also our 
internal world. Intentions are the key elements in these processes: their volitive 
function represents the quintessence of what the psychic kernel of the person wants in 
this particular situation; their executive function, on the other hand, represents the 
power to control the world. Both functions of intentions are needed for fulfilling this 
key position and for constituting actions. Intentions without executive function would 
be powerless desires; they would not enable us to control the world and condemn us 
to remain passive spectators, suffering from our unfulfilled desires. Intentions without 
volitive function, on the other hand, would be blind powers without a person behind 
them. It would not be us who are controlling the behaviour; we would "act" like a 
robot. And our "actions" or, more precisely, our controlled behaviour (if it were not 
completely organised by evolution) only accidentally would have any value for us, 
                                                 
2
  For Aristotle the intention (prohairesis) is "what has been decided on by previous deliberation" 
[Aristotle, E.N. 1112a, 15-17]. Leibniz slightly criticises Locke's definition and defines 'volition' in 
opposition to it as "the effort or tendency towards what one finds to be good and against what one 
finds to be bad, in such a way that this tendency results immediately from the apperception of the 
good and the bad" [Leibniz <1704> 1996, II,xxi,5; my, C.L., translation]. For Kant, as usually, a 
volition is an exertion of the will; and the 'will' is defined, e.g., as: the capacity to act according to 
the representation of the laws; and because the deduction of actions from laws requires reason, the 
will is practical reason [Kant, Groundwork, BA 37 = IV 412]. 
3
  There are several types of intentions. In particular, we have to distinguish implementation intentions 
and goal intentions [Gollwitzer 1999], where goal intentions determine the goal to be reached but 
do not yet specify the details of the action, by which it shall be reached, in a way understandable to 
the executive system. Goal intentions are anchors for a further deliberation with the aim to specify 
the action and to form an implementation intention, which is understandable to the executive 
system. Of course, only implementation intentions but not mere goal intentions have a (direct) 
executive function. 
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and in any case on average would have less value than the actions of a rational agent. 
So, a definition of 'intention' that tries to capture the practically pivotal position of 
intentions has to embrace both functions of intentions.  
 It might be helpful to explain this also in other words. Intentions are an essential 
element of actions. The very value expressed in the concept of action, i.e. what we (at 
least intuitively) appreciate in actions, as opposed to controlled mere behaviour, is 
their function to make us, or more precisely our internal kernel, control the world – 
this is what makes up freedom and autonomy, at least in a rudimentary form. This 
function implies an influence of our self on the world. The pivotal element, the hinge 
of this relation is the intention, which connects the two parts. Its volitive function 
represents and enables the authorship of the self; and its executive function makes up 
the controlling influence on the world. Therefore, we need both, the volitive and the 
executive function of intentions for having a full-fledged and, in the sense explained, 
valuable intention and a full-fledged, i.e. free action.  
 The just given justification of the Two-Function Thesis is a practical 
justification. It shows why intentions with both functions are precious and much better 
than similar attitudes with only one of these functions. This practical justification is 
part of the methodological strategy of this paper, namely to explicate the concept of 
intention in such a way that the resulting definition captures (intensionally) what is 
valuable in the referent (or in the extension).4 Of course, this method is different from 
and goes beyond trying to capture a common sense meaning (of the word which 
expresses the concept) or the philosopher's meaning or intuition.  
3. Two Theories of Intentions as Mere Executive States – 
Bratman and Mele 
All this, in particular the Two-Function Thesis, seems to be so obvious that it is hard 
to imagine how it can be denied. However, a theory which holds that actions are only 
executive states does exactly this. So this view has to be considered. In particular, I 
will discuss Bratman's and Mele's versions of such a theory.  
 Bratman's most important ideas about our subject can be summarized in the 
form of three theses:  
 
B1. Intentions as Executive States: Intentions are (defined as) executive states 
[Bratman 1987, 16; 108; (110)].  
B2. Uniqueness of Intentions: The (executive) role of intentions cannot be played 
by other mental states like desires, beliefs, desire-belief pairs or value judgments, 
in particular optimality judgements [Bratman 1987, 8; 11; 18 f.; 22; 32; 37 f.].  
B3. Intentions as Attitudes sui generis: Intentions are mental attitudes in their own 
right, or sui generis, i.e. not reducible to other common mental attitudes like 
beliefs, desires, desire-belief pairs [Bratman 1987, 10; 20; 110].  
 
 I want to argue that these three theses are false, or more precisely, because they 
all are highly ambiguous, that their most common interpretations are false.  
 The Intention-as-Executive-States thesis B1, without the parenthesis, can be 
understood as an analytical or as an empirical thesis, and the word "are" may be 
interpreted as the copula or as the predicate for the identity relation. It is not 
                                                 
4
  This piece of method is part of a more comprehensive philosophical method and theory, which I 
have called "idealising hermeneutics". For a detailed description see: Lumer 2011. 
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completely clear which interpretation Bratman has in mind, probably the analytical 
identity. I think, according to the common usage of the word "intention", it is indeed 
analytically true that one function of (implementation) intentions is to control actions. 
However, what has been said in the first two sections of this paper is a strong 
argument against the analytical identity; intentions have also the volitive function.  
 There seems to be an analytical argument for the Uniqueness-of-Intentions 
thesis B2: If intentions, desires, beliefs, value judgements are all defined as functional 
notions then they have different analytical functions. This implies that desires, beliefs 
etc. as such do not have the analytical function of intentions. So far so good. However 
this does not imply that desires, beliefs etc., apart from their analytical function 
cannot fulfil other functions as well.5  
 That intentions are attitudes sui generis, i.e. B3, again can be an analytical or an 
empirical thesis.  
 
B3.1 (Analytical interpretation) definition of 'sui-generis intention': 'Intention' is a 
taxonomic notion, referring to certain mental attitudes that are not reducible to 
other common mental attitudes.  
B3.2 (Empirical interpretation) Empirical Sui-generis Thesis: Functional 
intentions (executive states) are (as can be found out by observation) sui-generis 
intentions in the just (B3.1), taxonomically defined sense [Bratman 1987, 10; 20; 
110].  
 
 Most likely Bratman holds both theses. One of his innovations in action theory 
was to introduce "intention" also as taxonomic notion – "taxonomic" in the sense of 
biological taxonomies: We study empirically and try to classify the various mental 
attitudes into a complete system of not overlapping classes according to their 
phenomenological qualities, their propositional contents, and their functions. Bratman 
sustains that there is such a taxonomic kind of mental states besides and on a par with 
beliefs, desires, emotions, feelings, moods, perceptions etc.; and this kind of states is 
called "intention". So, Bratman uses the term "intention" in two meanings, the 
taxonomical meaning (attitude sui generis) and the functional meaning (executive 
state).  
 Some arguments against the Empirical Sui-generis Thesis B3.2 are these. The 
main problem of sui-generis intentions is that they cannot fulfil the volitive function 
of intentions. They are just executive. Taxonomic intentions as such are not 
preferences, desires, volitions etc. and do not contain or express such pro-attitudes. In 
addition, again precisely because of their taxonomic autonomy, they are isolated and 
not connected to other mental states that are such pro-attitudes; there is no intuitive 
kind of "logic" that relates them to pro-attitudes. More specifically, sui-generis 
intentions as such are not the result of practical deliberations and are completely cut 
off from these deliberations. Therefore, actions on the basis of such intentions would 
not have the advantages sketched at the beginning of this paper, i.e. that by actions 
caused by intentions the kernel of our self controls the world. In Bratman's theory the 
intentions come out of nothing, and, therefore, they can neither be rational nor realize 
our practical autonomy, they simply remain unexplained.  
 Mele has tried to resolve some of these problems by complementing Bratman's 
Empirical Sui-generis Thesis (B3.2) by some hypotheses about empirical laws that 
connect sui-generis intentions to other mental attitudes [Mele 1992, 228-240]. The 
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  McCann has shown that several other mental states in principle can fulfil many functions of 
intentions [McCann 1995, 575-582]. 
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most important of these hypotheses is that optimality judgements about one's own 
actions by default cause sui-generis intentions to execute these actions [Mele 1992, 
228-232]. This hypothesis implies an important structural suggestion with respect to 
the two functions of intentions emphasized in the preceding sections. According to 
Mele's theory, the volitive and the executive part of intentions would not reside in one 
and the same mental state but in two states that are closely connected by a causal 
relation. I will call this the "ontological dissociation of the two functions of 
intentions".  
 Mele's complement is an important improvement of Bratman's theory. However, 
many problems remain unsolved. If the ontological dissociation thesis were true the 
optimality judgements would completely control the sui-generis intentions. Then, 
however, two questions arise. First, why would there be any need of these sui-generis 
intentions? From an evolutionary standpoint they would be completely superfluous, 
the optimality judgements could directly be the set point determiner for the executive 
part of our action-generating mechanism; this speaks against the existence of sui-
generis intentions. Now, sometimes in living beings there are features or items 
superfluous with respect to survival, which have not been erased by evolution. 
However, such features or items are relatively rare, such that the evolutionary 
superfluity of possible sui-generis intentions makes their existence rather unlikely. So, 
demonstrating this superfluity is not a knock-down argument but an argument of 
medium strenght against the existence of sui-generis intentions.  Second, even if there 
were such a sui-generis intention the optimality judgement would already be an 
executive state that controls the external behaviour by causing the sui-generis 
intention; forming the sui-generis "intention" instead would already be the first step of 
execution.  
4. The Dissociation Problem 
According to the ideas exposed in the preceding sections, the definition of 
'(implementation) intention' seems to be straightforward: Implementation intentions 
are mental states that are volitive and executive. This would imply that mental states 
not fulfilling one of these functions would not be (implementation) intentions. 
However there may be cases of dissociation between the two functions that give rise 
to doubts about this definition.  
 There are two main forms of dissociation. The first form is causal dissociation. 
There is a certain kind of mental states that usually fulfils both functions. Both 
functions, however, are defined by the causal role the respective states play. (For the 
volitive function it is to integrate the various pro-attitudes and thus to be caused by 
them via a more or less complicate mechanism of integration; for the executive 
function it is to cause or at least to initiate the execution – which does not exclude that 
the execution then is interrupted.) One or both causal chains, now, may be cut off (and 
not only interrupted) by accident or other unfortunate circumstances. Certain forms of 
posthypnotic instructions, where the hypnotiser gives an instruction to execute a 
certain action later on and the hypnotized executes this instruction after the hypnosis, 
prima facie may be losses of the volitive function. Another, more fantastic example, 
would be hybrid creatures of a Brave New World type who have been created for 
serving their masters irrespective of any personal concern; so, if their masters say "do 
this!" then they immediately form the respective executive intention. Cases of the 
locked-in syndrome, on the other hand, prima facie are losses of the executive 
function: as a consequence of a dreadful trauma, the brain looses every or nearly every 
6 CHRISTOPH LUMER 
 
afferent and efferent contact to the rest of the body with the consequence to have no 
longer sensory perceptions and behavioural control of the body. The person may form 
"intentions" without any executive effect. (In the usual cases of executive accidents 
like forgetting the intention, akrasia etc., the executive function exists but it does not 
work properly.)  
 The other form of dissociation of the volitive and the executive function is 
ontological dissociation: both functions are fulfilled but they are realized by different 
mental states which, however, empirically are closely related and covary rather 
strictly. Mele's model of sui-generis intentions that are often caused by optimality 
judgements describes such a form of dissociation.  
 Before discussing the consequences of dissociation for the definition of 
'intention' let us briefly consider the real existence or possibility of dissociation. With 
respect to the ontological dissociation, in the last section I have already advanced 
strong empirical objections against the hypothesis that mere executive states, in 
particular sui-generis intentions exist. However, these objections do not amount to a 
rejection of a logical or analytical possibility of such cases. Therefore, for a definition 
that shall also cover intentions in non-human beings, e.g. aliens or future people 
created by genetic or other technological manipulation, it would be wise to reckon 
with the possibility of ontological dissociation. – Apart from the hybrid beings, the 
other examples of causal dissociation were real examples, which, of course, have to 
be taken into account in a definition of '(implementation) intention'.  
5. Dealing with Dissociations in the Definition of 'Intention' 
How should the possible dissociations be dealt with in the definition of 
'(implementation) intention'? Let us consider causal dissociation first. The case of the 
hybrid beings who never had any volitive states combined with their executive states 
runs clearly counter the arguments advanced before (in section 2) in favour of 
intentions as necessary combinations of volitive and executive states. Accordingly, 
the hybrid beings' executive states would not be intentions. The same would hold for 
volitive states that never had any executive function. The case of the locked-in 
syndrome and perhaps posthypnotic instruction is different. Here the problem seems 
to be not the lacking of an executive (or volitive) function of the intention but a 
temporary or definite loss of a formerly existing function of the executive system, due 
to a dysfunction. Therefore, in such cases one might say: if there are phenomenal 
states that are of a kind that originally had (or in other beings usually has) the volitive 
as well as the executive function these states are still intentions even if one of these 
functions has gone lost.  
 With respect to a possible ontological dissociation of volitive and executive 
states the following holds: If there is no ontological dissociation the rules just 
explained apply. If, however, volitive and executive states ontologically dissociate but 
are nevertheless closely connected – as in Mele's model – then there are four main 
strategies to define 'intention' in the light of the requirement that intentions fulfil both 
functions.  
1. Only states with both functions: Only states that fulfil both, the volitive as well as 
the executive function are intentions. Hence in case of an ontological dissociation 
there would not be an intention.  
2. Unity of both states: In case of an ontological dissociation the unity of the tightly 
connected volitive and executive state is the intention.  
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3. Only the executive state: In case of an ontological dissociation the executive state is 
the intention if it emerges from a corresponding volitive state.  
4. Only the volitive state: In case of an ontological dissociation the volitive state is the 
intention if it directly causes a corresponding executive state.  
 Let us briefly discuss these possibilities:  
1. Only states with both functions: To acknowledge only states with both, the volitive 
and the executive function as intentions is a puristic strategy. In a world with 
ontological dissociation it would exclude too much of what is sufficiently near to the 
ideal from being an intention. So, this kind of definition would be too narrow. The 
following three definitions are all more liberal in this respect, admitting intentions 
also in cases of ontological dissociation. In this respect the three remaining 
approaches are on a par. So further considerations should decide between them.  
2. Unity of both states: To take the unity of the volitive and the executive state as the 
intention, on the one hand, comprises everything which is necessary for the existence 
of the intention in the intention itself. This advantage, however, is not so strong 
because it may be sufficient to require these necessary conditions as conditions and 
not as parts of the intention. On the other hand, the unity of two separate events or 
states may cause some problems for the determination of causal relations and of the 
intentions' time: If we say 'the intention caused the action', more precisely it would be 
the executive part of the intention that caused the action. And if we say 'she formed 
her intention at time t' this should refer either to the forming of the volitive or of the 
executive state. Therefore, it may be better to identify the intention with one state.  
3. Only the executive state: An argument for declaring the executive states that 
emerged from volitions to be intentions would be that because the executive states 
already arise from volitions and add to this the executive function they comprise 
everything important for an intention in them. However, one could object to this, first, 
that if the volitive and the executive state dissociate and the volitive state controls or 
determines the executive state then the volitive state is already executive, whereas e.g. 
the sui-generis intention is already the first element of the execution process itself. 
Mere executive states are translations of the volition into a first grade machine code 
that is still mentally accessible. Second, apart from their function, mere executive 
states are no pro-attitudes in the narrow sense; they do not express that the subject is 
desideratively or emotionally or otherwise deliberatively bound to the action to be 
executed. Therefore, mere executive states fulfil a volitive function, if at all, only in a 
very, very broad sense.  
4. Only the volitive state: The argument advanced against taking the executive states 
as the intentions, of course, is a straightforward argument for taking the volitive states 
as the intentions. If volitive states cause also the executive state they are in a certain 
sense executive above their volitive function. One might think that an analogous 
argument holds for the executive states: because they rise from volitive states and thus 
comprise them they are also, in a weak sense perhaps, volitive states. However, they 
are not; mere executive states, as just said, are not pro-attitudes in a somewhat narrow 
sense, and they are not the last step of making up one's mind about the options at 
hand. So there is a disanalogy here. Mere executive states that arise from volitions are 
not volitive, whereas mere volitive states that cause executive states are already 
executive. And this is a strong argument to choose among these two the volitive states 
as those that in cases of ontological dissociation are the implementation intentions.  
 The details of this definitional decision may be debatable. However, what is less 
debatable and important for capturing the essential function of intentions and actions 
8 CHRISTOPH LUMER 
 
is that only the combinations of volitive and executive states are implementation 
intentions. Mere executive states are not yet intentions.  
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